

# A survey on Detection and Prevention Techniques for Black hole Attack in MANET Architecture

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*Abstract: In MANET there are many attacks, the black hole attack is one of the well-known security threats in mobile ad-hoc networks. The attacker node utilizes the illegal action to carry out their malicious behaviors because the route discovery process is necessary and inevitable. Many researchers have conducted different detection techniques to propose different types of detection schemes. In this paper, we will suggest a solution for prevention of attacks and discuss the state-of-the-art for various routing methods. We not only classify these proposals into single black hole attack and collaborative black hole attack but also analyze the categories of these solutions and provide a comparison table. We expect to furnish more researchers with a detailed work in anticipation.*

*Keywords: Mobile ad hoc networks, routing protocols, single black hole attack, collaborative black hole attack*

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

A MANET is a collection of wireless nodes which are movable by nature and also have the ability to transfer data with its destination node. Also there is not any fixed infrastructure as well as no central base station. Due to the reason that mobile nodes are not controlled by any external entity, they have freedom in mobility and connectivity to each other. Network management and routing are done mutually by every node in network. Due to limited reception and transmission power, An architecture is needed which is having multi hop environment for one node to communicate with another throughout the network. Generally in multi hop architecture, each node works as a host and as well as a node that forwards packets to other nodes that might not be within a direct range for communication. Each router participates in a route discovery protocol which finds out multi hop routes through the mobile network between any two communicating nodes. These infrastructures-less mobile nodes dynamically create routes among themselves to establish their own wireless network rapidly. Thus, mobile ad hoc networks provide an extremely flexible communication method for any place where geographical or terrestrial constraints are present and need network system without any fixed architecture, such as battlefields, and some

disaster management situations. Recent research on MANET shows that the MANET has larger security issues than conventional networks [1,2]. Any security solutions for static networks would not be suitable for MANET. Zhou et al. [1] and Lundberg [3] discussed several types of attacks that can easily be performed against a MANET.

In the black hole attack, malicious nodes provide false routing information to the source node whose packets they want to intercept. In one another attack known as denial of service attacks, malicious node floods the targeted node so that the network or the node no longer operates correctly. In route table overflow attacks, an attacker tries to create lots of routes to non existence nodes and overflows the routing tables. In impersonation attack, malicious node may impersonate any other node while sending the request packet to create an anomaly update in routing table. In this paper, we will focus on the black hole and cooperative black hole attacks. The main contributions of this work are threefold. First, we implement the simulation of the solutions proposed for the cooperative black hole attacks. Second, we also add some changes to the algorithm to improve the accuracy in preventing black hole attacks. For example, previously the algorithm does not check current intermediate node for black hole

if the next hop is not reliable. This proposed algorithm does not give any details about the implementation of the algorithm. In this paper we completely describe the implementation details which we address the several issues which are not considered in [9]. Finally, we are going to compare the performance of the Modified protocol and solution with other existing solutions on the basis of various performance matrices like PDR, Throughput, and e2e Delay etc.

## 2. RELATED WORKS

The routing protocols proposed for MANETs can be classified into four broad categories [4]: Flat routing, Hierarchical routing, GPS routing, and Power based routing. Flat routing is the most widely used category. These flat routing protocols can be further classified into two main sub groups [6]: table driven and on-demand routing protocols. The table driven routing protocol is a proactive scheme in which each node maintains consistent and up to date routing information to every other node in the network. Every routing change in the network should be propagated through the network in order to maintain consistent routing information. In the on-demand routing (reactive routing), any node creates route only when it needs to send some data to the destination. The source node initiates route discovery process when necessary. There are three main routing protocols proposed for MANETs [4]: Ad hoc on demand Distance Vector (AODV) [5] routing, Dynamic Source Routing [DSR] [6], and Destination Sequence Distance Vector routing (DSDV) [7]. AODV and DSR belong to on- demand routing protocols and DSDV is a table-driven routing protocol.

In this paper, we focus on AODV. However, the proposed solution is also applicable to other on-demand protocols, such as DSR. The AODV protocol is vulnerable to the well-known black hole attack. A black hole is a node that always responds positively with a RREP message to every RREQ, even though it International Journal of Software Engineering and Its Applications Vol. 2, No. 3, July, 2008 41 does not really have a valid route to the destination node. Since a black hole node does not have to check its routing table, it is the first to respond to the RREQ in most cases. Then the source routes data through the black hole node, which will drop all the data packets it received rather than forwarding them to the destination. In this way the malicious node can easily misroute lot of network traffic

to itself and could cause an attack to the network with very little effort on it. These black hole nodes may work as a group. That means more than one black hole nodes work cooperatively to mislead other nodes. This type of attack is called cooperative black hole attack.

Researchers have proposed solutions to identify and eliminate black hole nodes . Deng et al. proposed a solution for individual black holes. But they have not considered the cooperative black hole attacks. According to their solution, information about the next hop to destination should be included in the RREP packet when any intermediate node replies for RREQ. Then the source node sends a further request (FREQ) to next hop of replied node and asks about the replied node and route to the destination. By using this method we can identify trustworthiness of the replied node only if the next hop is trusted. However, this solution cannot prevent cooperative black hole attacks on MANETs. For example, if the next hop also cooperates with the replied node, the reply for the FREQ will be simply "yes" for both questions. Then the source will trust on next hop and send data through the replied node which is a black hole node.

Ramaswamy et al. proposed a solution to defending against the cooperative black hole attacks. no simulations or performance evaluations have been done. Ramaswamy et al. studied multiple black hole attacks on mobile ad hoc networks However; they only considered multiple black holes, in which there is no collaboration between these black hole nodes. In this paper, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in defending against the collaborative black hole attack. Yin et al. proposed a solution to defending against black hole attacks in wireless sensor networks. The scenario that they considered in sensor networks is quite different than MANETs. They consider the static sensor network with manually deployed cluster heads. They did not consider the mobility of nodes. Also they have one sink node and all sensors send all the data to the sink. Each node needs to find out the route only to the sink. Since this scenario is not compatible with MANET, we are not going to discuss it further. In this paper we simulate the algorithm proposed with several changes to improve the accuracy of preventing cooperative black hole attacks and to improve the efficiency of the process. We also simulate AODV.

### Black Hole Attack

In this attack a malicious node may advertise a good path to a destination during routing process. The intention of the node may be to hinder the path finding process or interpret the packet being sent to destination. Alternatively black-hole scenario may be defined as the one in which the channel properties tend to be asymmetric i.e. the signal strength in both direction may not be same. In this case a node which receives the data packet but does not forward it is termed as black hole. In either case the normal operation of the MANET is disrupted.

#### **Byzantine Attack**

Here compromised intermediate nodes carries out attack such as loops, routing packets on non optimal paths and selectively dropping packet.

#### **Wormhole Attack**

In this attack, an attacker receives packets at one location and tunnels them at another location where these packets are resent into the network. In the absence of proper security mechanisms, most of the existing routing protocols may fail to find the valid routes.

#### **Information Disclosure**

A compromised network node may leak the important or confidential information such as network topology, geographical information of nodes and optimal routes to the nodes etc.

#### **Resource Consumption Attack**

An attacker node acting as intermediate node may initiate unnecessary request for routes, frequent generation of beacon packets or forwarding stale routes to nodes. This result in over consumption of nodes limited resources and keeps the node unnecessary occupied. In this paper we analyze the impact of the presence of the black-hole nodes on the MANET performance. We have found that as the percentage of black hole nodes increases, the network performance degrades.

### **3. AD-HOC ROUTING PROTOCOLS AND BLACK HOLE ATTACK**

An ad-hoc routing protocol[8] is a convention, or standard, that controls how nodes decide which way to

route packets between computing devices in a mobile ad hoc network. Being one of the category of ad-hoc routing protocols, on-demand protocols such as AODV [4] (Ad-hoc on demand Distance Vector) and DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) establish routes between nodes only when they are required to route data packets. AODV is one of the most common ad-hoc routing protocols used for mobile ad-hoc networks. As its name indicates AODV is an on-demand routing protocol that discovers a route only when there is a demand from mobile nodes in the network. In an ad-hoc network that uses AODV[4][6] as a routing protocol, a mobile node that wishes to communicate with other node first broadcasts an RREQ (Route Request) message to find a fresh route to a desired destination node. This process is called route discovery every neighboring node that receives RREQ broadcast first saves the path the RREQ was transmitted along to its routing table. It subsequently checks its routing table to see if it has a fresh enough route to the destination node provided in the RREQ message. The freshness of a route is indicated by a destination sequence number that is attached to it. If a node finds a fresh enough route, it unicast an RREP (Route Reply) message back along the saved path to the source node or it re-broadcasts the RREQ message otherwise. Route discovery is a vulnerability of on-demand ad-hoc routing protocols, especially AODV, which an adversary can exploit to perform a black hole attack on mobile ad-hoc networks. A malicious node in the network receiving an RREQ message replies to source nodes by sending a fake RREP message that contains desirable parameters to be chosen for packet delivery to destination nodes. After promising (by sending a fake RREP to confirm it has a path to a destination node) to source nodes that it will forward data, a malicious node starts to drop all the network traffic it receives from source nodes. This deliberate dropping of packets by a malicious node is what we call a black hole attack.

**Comparison Table between different methods.**

S no	Research Paper	Method	Black hole Nodes	Network Parameters (AODV vs Modified AODV)			Limitations	Detection and identification strength
				PDR	E2e Delay	Routing overhead		
(1)	<b>Prevention of Black-hole attack in MANET(12)</b>	Repeated next hop node	Detect single Black-hole node	increased	increased (due to wait and check of replies)	increased	Work same as AODV in absence of repeated next hop node, detect Black hole attack only up to single level	Identification of Black hole attack at multiple levels
(2)	<b>Black hole attack detection and prevention by real time monitoring (13)</b>	Real Time Monitoring of nodes	Detect single Black-hole node	increased	Slightly increased	Overhead increased (depends on threshold, control packets sent to check the node reliability)	Identification depends upon the value of threshold	Detect a cooperative Black hole node attack using real time monitoring
(3)	<b>Detecting And overcoming Black-hole attack in AODV Protocol (14)</b>	Honesty of node by receiving opinion from other nodes	Detect Single Black-hole node	Increased,	Increased (time in overcoming attack and resume)	increased (time to take opinion from neighbors)	The methods works well for Black-hole attack but unable to detect more than one Black-hole node	Algorithm can be implemented for other routing protocol attacks like gray-hole, wormhole etc
(4)	<b>Prevention of Black hole attack in MANET (15)</b>	Difference in Sequence number	Detect single Black-hole node	increased	slightly increased( in comparing sequence number)		If sequence number is not extremely large I will not be able to detect Black hole node	Simulations to analyze performance based on other parameters like mean to mean delay time, mobility etc

(5)	<b>Secure route discovery for preventing Black hole attack on AODV – based ,mantes</b>	Defined threshold for maximum destination n sequence number in different environments	Detect single Black hole node	increase d		overhead increased in comparing the sequence number with threshold value	Routing overhead increases as source node and destination nodes both are comparing sequence number with	Security mechanism for data transmissions between the source node and destination node after a route has been Established.
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#### 4. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we studied the problem of black hole attacks under MANET Scenario. Due to the unspecified design there are many limitations of routing protocol in MANETs; many researchers have conducted various techniques to suggest different types of prevention mechanisms from black hole problem under MANET scenario. The proposals are proposed in a illogical order and divided into single black hole and cooperative black hole attack. According to this work, we observe that how the AODV routing protocol works and then implemented black hole attack on it at the same time a trust based mechanism for its prevention. The trust based detection method has the better packet delivery ratio and correct black hole node detection probability, but suffered from the higher routing overhead due to the periodically broadcast packets. The other proposed method which is reactive detection method eliminates the routing overhead problem from the on demand way of route generation. Our complete implementation reveals that the proposed method of trust mechanism when applied on AODV protocol gives better results in all the cases for MANET as compared with normal AODV in case of black hole attack.

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